by Muhamad Mohsin Iqbal
Pakistan’s debate on the formation of new provinces continues to surface with renewed vigour, driven by the practical difficulties of governing a nation whose population now exceeds two hundred and forty million within an administrative framework that has remained largely unchanged since 1970. At present the country comprises four provinces—Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan—alongside the Islamabad Capital Territory and the territories of Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Calls for additional units, whether limited to South Punjab or Hazara or extending to schemes of twelve, fifteen or even thirty provinces, arise from administrative overload, regional disparities, population pressure and a widespread sense that distant provincial capitals cannot respond adequately to local needs.
Those who favour reorganisation contend that smaller provinces would shrink the administrative distance that now separates citizens from decision-makers. Capitals such as Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar and Quetta lie far from many districts, impeding timely action in health, education, policing and disaster management. New units could adapt policies to regional circumstances, lessen the dominance of Punjab—which alone accounts for roughly half the national population—and grant under-represented areas a fuller voice in provincial assemblies, the Senate and the distribution of resources. Institutions and development funds, long concentrated in existing capitals, might spread more evenly, while cultural and linguistic identities, notably those of Seraiki and Hindko speakers, would receive formal recognition. Smaller governments, being easier to monitor, could weaken dynastic politics, encourage middle-class leadership and heighten official accountability. Proponents frequently cite India’s expansion from a handful of units to twenty-eight states and Afghanistan’s larger number of provinces, arguing that fixed large entities struggle when populations multiply several times over.
Opponents, however, emphasise the heavy fiscal and administrative burden. Every new province would necessitate a governor, chief minister, cabinet, assembly, high court, secretariat, housing, vehicles, security and pensions, expanding the political class and locking in higher recurring expenditure at a moment when Pakistan already contends with deficits, debt and disputed National Finance Commission awards. Division along ethnic or linguistic lines risks intensifying identity politics, generating boundary disputes and fostering fragmentation rather than national cohesion. Constitutionally, the creation or alteration of provinces demands a two-thirds majority in both houses of Parliament together with the consent of the affected provincial assembly under Article 239—an exacting requirement in a polarised political climate.
Experience suggests that new units would not automatically cure deeper ailments of weak institutions, elite capture and insufficient accountability; they might merely transplant the same patronage networks closer to the districts. The protracted difficulties that have attended the merger of the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa illustrate how restructuring can lag for years. More provinces would also complicate federal arrangements for resource sharing and Senate representation, while smaller entities might prove financially fragile and more dependent on the centre.
These arguments gain sharper relief when set against the historical evolution of Pakistan’s provincial map. Upon independence in 1947 the western wing consisted of West Punjab, Sind, the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, supplemented by acceding princely states such as Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Kalat and others. Karachi was separated as a federal capital territory, and the Baloch states briefly formed a union. The One Unit scheme, announced in 1954 and implemented in October 1955, merged all western provinces and states into a single Province of West Pakistan in order to establish parity with East Pakistan and curb provincialism.
Though intended to reduce costs and facilitate constitution-making, the scheme centralised power and provoked deep resentment in Sindh, the North-West Frontier Province and Balochistan, where it was viewed as an assault on regional identity. It endured for fifteen years until President Yahya Khan’s Legal Framework Order of 1970 dissolved West Pakistan and restored four provinces along roughly pre-1955 lines, with adjustments incorporating former states. After the secession of East Pakistan in 1971, these four provinces formed the core of the residual state. The 1973 Constitution confirmed the structure.
Subsequent refinements included the formalisation of Islamabad Capital Territory, the renaming of Baluchistan and Sind, greater autonomy for Gilgit-Baltistan in 2009, the redesignation of the North-West Frontier Province as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2010—which itself intensified Hazara demands—and the 2018 merger of the tribal areas into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa under the 25th Amendment. Throughout this period, demands for a Seraiki or South Punjab province, the restoration of Bahawalpur, or further divisions have persisted, yet no new full province has been created since 1970.
Running parallel is the equally uneven history of local government, often advanced as a less costly alternative to provincial multiplication. Colonial-era panchayats and municipal bodies were inherited in attenuated form and received scant attention in the early years of independence. Ayub Khan’s Basic Democracies system of 1959 established a hierarchical network of union, tehsil, district and divisional councils whose members served both as local administrators and as an electoral college, giving unprecedented formal weight to grassroots institutions while securing legitimacy for military rule.
After a decline under civilian government, Zia-ul-Haq revived elected local bodies through the 1979 ordinance, holding successive non-party elections. Musharraf’s devolution plan of 2001 went further, creating a three-tier structure of union, tehsil and district councils headed by elected nazims, transferring substantial administrative and developmental powers and reserving seats for women and other groups. Each of these military-era experiments elevated local institutions, yet civilian administrations have more often delayed elections, dissolved councils or recentralised authority.
The 18th Amendment of 2010 constitutionally required provinces, under Article 140-A, to establish elected local governments and devolve political, administrative and financial powers. Provincial laws followed, and elections were held in phases from 2013 onward, yet implementation has remained inconsistent, with frequent interruptions and incomplete fiscal autonomy. Many observers therefore maintain that consistent empowerment of genuine local governments would secure most of the advantages claimed for new provinces—proximity, responsiveness and accountability—without the fiscal burden or the risk of ethnic fragmentation.
In the end the controversy mirrors genuine shortcomings of oversized administration, uneven development and distant governance. Smaller provinces, if fashioned primarily around administrative efficiency rather than pure ethnicity and underpinned by strong institutions and fiscal prudence, might ease certain pressures. It is highly likely that the political parties in Parliament and beyond will approve this proposed arrangement with consent, semi-consent, or a mix of both. Time will now determine the extent to which it is implemented. Yet the formidable costs, constitutional obstacles and dangers of further division lead a substantial body of opinion to favour first the thorough strengthening of local government. Any lasting reorganisation would require broad national consensus and meticulous design if it is not to aggravate the difficulties it seeks to resolve.
