By Baseer Ali Rahman Khan
Pakistan’s civil service, once regarded as a pillar of state stability and good
governance, has witnessed a gradual but serious decline in effectiveness,
coherence and institutional purpose. This deterioration is especially evident in
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), where the previously collaborative relationship
between the civil bureaucracy and the police force has broken down. The
introduction of legal instruments such as the Police Order 2002 and the KP Police Act 2017
significantly altered this relationship, leading to institutional fragmentation, inter-departmental
conflict, and diminished public trust.
Traditionally, the civil service ensured continuity, accountability and coordination in public
administration. The Police Order 2002 was enacted to depoliticize the police and enhance
professionalism. However, it disrupted the executive magistracy system by separating the
police from the direct oversight of the District Administration. The KP Police Act 2017 further
distanced the police from civilian control by granting it unprecedented autonomy, thereby
weakening the Deputy Commissioner’s role in maintaining law and order.
These legal shifts created parallel structures creating fissures within the local governance
system. Rather than promoting cooperation, they fostered institutional rivalry and weakened
administrative coordination. Law enforcement and civil bureaucracy began operating in
isolation from one another, leading to delays in decision-making, reduced responsiveness and
confusion during crisis management. This situation, though seemingly a result of reform,
became a source of dysfunction.
Recognizing the consequences of this institutional drift, the KP Government took a decisive
step in 2024 by introducing key amendments to the KP Police Act 2017. These amendments
aim to restore democratic oversight and reestablish a balanced relationship between civil
administration and the police.
The changes include a clear reaffirmation of executive authority. By amending Section 4(4),
the Police Department is now legally bound to follow the Chief Minister’s directives
concerning law and order. Additionally, revisions to Section 11 place the Inspector General of
Police, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa under the supervision of the Chief Minister through the Home
Secretary, ensuring that police operations align with government policy.
To enhance democratic accountability, amendments to Sections 17(4), 17(7), 21, and 24 require
the Chief Minister’s approval for senior police appointments. The Provincial Government’s
authority under Section 140 to formulate rules has also been restored. These provisions reduce
the potential for unaccountable decision-making and ensure that senior appointments reflect
broader public interest.
In terms of public oversight, the previous system of Public Safety Commissions has been
replaced with a Public Complaints Authority. Composed of members appointed by the
Provincial Assembly and monitored by the Chief Minister’s office, this new mechanism aims
to bring public accountability under the direct watch of elected representatives. While it has
drawn some concerns regarding the potential for reduced independence, the move is consistent
with principles of representative democracy.
The Home and Tribal Affairs Department, Government of KP has also been empowered
through changes to Sections 8 and 11, placing it under the direct control of the Chief Minister
and Chief Secretary. This step is designed to streamline policy coordination and prevent
fragmentation in administrative execution. However, no practical implementation thereof is yet
to been seen as was once the customary practice of the Home Department in earlier times.
These reforms signal a strategic realignment rather than superficial changes. By placing
policing within a framework of democratic accountability and integrating it with civil
administration, the incumbent KP Government has shown clarity of purpose and constitutional
commitment. The new system corrects structural imbalances, enhances public trust and
reasserts civilian oversight as a core principle of governance.
Nonetheless, successful implementation will depend on consistent political will, institutional
capacity building and safeguards against potential misuse of authority. Training, orientation
and procedural checks must accompany the legal amendments to ensure that the intended
benefits materialize.
Looking ahead, the key recommendation is for the provincial government to institutionalize
these reforms through sustained capacity development, performance monitoring and inclusive
feedback mechanisms. Additionally, efforts should be made to reinforce coordination
platforms at the district level, ensure that oversight bodies remain effective and impartial and
maintain a balanced distribution of authority to prevent institutional capture by any one actor.
To realize this objective, it is imperative that Regional Police Officers (RPOs) and District
Police Officers (DPOs) be made directly accountable to the respective Divisional
Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners. This measure is essential for reinstating the
former efficacy of the District Administration thereby ensuring that its positive impact is
tangibly experienced by the public, as was the case in earlier times.
In a nutshell, the KP Government’s reforms represent a thoughtful response to long-standing
administrative dysfunction. By restoring clarity, reinforcing accountability and placing
governance back within democratic structures, the province has set a strong precedent. If
followed through with integrity and continued vigilance, this approach holds promise for
broader administrative revival across Pakistan.
