Dr. Gul.i.Ayesha Bhatti
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) was never designed for an India and Pakistan that trusted one another. It was forged for precisely the opposite: two sovereign states divided by war, the Kashmir dispute, and deep strategic hostility, yet ecologically compelled to share one of the world’s most consequential river systems. For over six decades, this complex hydrological bargain survived the wars of 1965 and 1971, the Kargil conflict, and repeated military standoffs. Its extraordinary endurance was not evidence of permanent friendship. It was definitive proof that codified international law can enforce state behavior where bilateral political relations fail. As a cornerstone of regional stability, the IWT remains one of South Asia’s most enduring confidence-building measures.
That is why the argument presented in Newsweek by Vinay Mohan Kwatra, India’s Ambassador to the United States, asserting that Pakistan “destroyed” the IWT before New Delhi placed it in “abeyance”, demands rigorous scrutiny. New Delhi attempts to frame its unilateral action as a response to security dynamics, using the April 2025 Pahalgam incident as a political pretext to bypass its treaty obligations. But in international law, political grievance and legal entitlement are entirely distinct domains. The central question remains remarkably simple: where does the text of the Treaty authorize either party to unilaterally place it in “abeyance”?
The answer is nowhere.
The Legal Fallacy of Unilateral Abeyance
India’s claim that Pakistan “destroyed” the Indus Waters Treaty is political rhetoric, not international law. The IWT contains no provision permitting unilateral “abeyance.” Article XII (4) explicitly dictates that the Treaty remains in force until terminated through a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between both governments. The framework establishes an exclusive institutional architecture for conflict resolution through the Permanent Indus Commission, Neutral Experts, and the Court of Arbitration, leaving absolutely no room for unilateral action. India cannot simply manufacture a suspension power that the text does not contain.
New Delhi’s attempt to justify its abeyance stance through terrorism allegations is equally untenable. Pakistan has consistently condemned terrorism, has itself endured enormous losses from it, and has repeatedly called for credible, impartial investigations rather than politically driven accusations. Allegations cannot substitute for evidence. Notably, UN Special Rapporteurs highlighted that India had not provided independently established proof linking the Pakistani state to the Pahalgam incident.
If New Delhi possesses conclusive evidence, the lawful course of action is to present it before an impartial international investigation. Until then, politically charged accusations cannot be transformed into a license to suspend a binding treaty. Claims of false-flag operations should likewise be subjected to independent inquiry rather than decided through unilateral narratives.
Obstructionism vs. Treaty Rights
Similarly flawed is the assertion that Pakistan’s use of the Treaty’s dispute-resolution machinery has “destroyed” the agreement. On the contrary, Pakistan’s recourse to a Neutral Expert or the Court of Arbitration over the Kishenganga and Ratle hydroelectric projects is a fundamental treaty right, not obstructionism. It is definitive evidence of Pakistan’s continued reliance on the exact legal infrastructure that both states mutually instituted.
India’s systematic disengagement from these accountability mechanisms exposes the legal weakness of its position. New Delhi has refused to participate in the Hague-based Court of Arbitration proceedings, rejected the established dispute-resolution framework, and failed to substantively engage with inquiries raised by UN Special Rapporteurs. However, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) process has continued notwithstanding India’s non-participation. Every successive determination under the framework has repeatedly reinforced the Treaty’s continuing validity, leaving India’s unilateral “abeyance” entirely devoid of legal credibility. A state cannot extinguish an international legal process simply by refusing to appear.
This conduct risks establishing a profoundly dangerous precedent: that a state may disregard treaty obligations, withdraw from adjudicatory processes, and expect unilateral political declarations to prevail over established law. If normalized, this hegemonic exceptionalism will erode treaty reliability and peaceful dispute settlement globally.
Volume vs. Flow: The Existential Stake
Furthermore, India’s repeated “80 percent versus 20 percent” water-split argument is deeply misleading. The IWT is not a simple annual arithmetic bargain. For Pakistan, a downstream state facing acute climate vulnerability and limited water storage capacity, security depends on the timing, predictability, continuity, and certainty of flows, particularly during critical agricultural seasons. A temporary disruption at a critical juncture can cause severe agricultural shocks that annual aggregate volume percentages cannot capture.
Pakistan’s water security is fundamentally tied to human security. Agriculture, livelihoods, food security, and economic stability depend upon predictable Indus flows. Any attempt by an upper riparian to manipulate the timing or continuity of transboundary flows creates devastating downstream economic and humanitarian consequences.
While domestic water management remains an internal challenge for Pakistan, treaty compliance is a separate international obligation with distinct legal implications. The core issue must be examined strictly through the principles of international water law, including pacta sunt servanda, good faith, and treaty stability.
The Lawful Path to Climate Resilience
India cannot simultaneously invoke the IWT when convenient and declare it inoperative when politically expedient. Selective compliance severely weakens the rules-based international order and exposes a profound inconsistency between New Delhi’s global rhetoric on international law and its regional conduct. Water must not be weaponized, treaty obligations are not optional, and Pakistan’s existential water security cannot be held hostage to India’s domestic political calculations.
Pakistan does not view the treaty as a static legal relic, but as a dynamic framework capable of addressing modern ecological realities. If the architecture requires modernization to withstand climate change, accelerating glacier melt, and shifting hydrology, the only lawful path forward is structured bilateral negotiation, amendment, and technical cooperation under Article XII.
Pakistan stands ready to engage in objective, rules-based transboundary water governance grounded in established international water law principles. However, the path to regional stability requires New Delhi to abandon its dangerous legal fiction of “abeyance,” cease its boycott of adjudicatory forums, and return to full treaty compliance. True climate resilience and security in the Indus Basin can only be sustained when international law overrides unilateral political narratives.
Dr. Gul.i.Ayesha Bhatti
The writer teaches at the Jinnah School of Public Policy and Leadership (JSPPL), NUST, Islamabad. She can be reached at guleayeshabhatti@gmail.com
