Barrister Usman Ali, Ph.D.
When more than a hundred members of a persecuted community are killed within days, and grieving families refuse burial in protest, the failure is no longer merely administrative; it becomes constitutional. The Hazara Killings suo motu case, PLD 2013 Balochistan 75, stands as one of Justice Qazi Faez Isa’s clearest statements on the state’s duty to protect life, uphold fundamental rights, and answer for institutional failure. From his tenure as Chief Justice of the Balochistan High Court to his later role as a judge, and eventually Chief Justice, of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Justice Isa’s jurisprudence has repeatedly emphasized that the state exists to protect its citizens, especially those most vulnerable to violence and discrimination. The Hazara Killings case remains one of the most important expressions of that constitutional vision.
The case arose from a wave of sectarian violence in Quetta, Baluchistan where the Hazara Shia community had long been subjected to targeted attacks. In early 2013, bombings on Alamdar Road and in Hazara Town killed scores of people and left many others injured. These attacks were widely attributed to extremist terrorist groups that had continued to operate with alarming persistence. What made these incidents especially troubling was not only their scale, but also the fact that they occurred despite prior intelligence warnings. The belief that these tragedies were preventable intensified public outrage. Families of the victims protested in freezing conditions, refusing to bury their loved ones until the government took meaningful action. It was against this background of grief, anger, and institutional failure that Justice Isa took suo motu notice, bringing the matter before the court without a formal petition.
In his judgment, Justice Isa refused to treat the violence as an unavoidable consequence of terrorism. Instead, he framed it as a failure of the state to fulfill its most basic constitutional obligation: the protection of life. The repeated targeting of the Hazara community, he held, amounted to a violation of fundamental rights, particularly the rights to life and security. Significantly, he did not confine responsibility to the perpetrators alone. The state, he reasoned, bears responsibility when it fails to act on credible threats, when its institutions do not coordinate effectively, and when known militant networks are allowed to operate with impunity. By shifting the focus from external threats to internal accountability, the judgment reframed the legal and constitutional understanding of terrorism in Pakistan.
What distinguishes this decision is the precision with which institutional failures were examined. Justice Isa did not rely on abstract criticism. He scrutinized the roles of law enforcement agencies, intelligence bodies, and both provincial and federal governments, identifying specific lapses that contributed to the attacks. These included ignored intelligence reports, weak checkpoint management, poor inter-agency coordination, and the failure to prosecute banned organizations effectively. At several points, the judgment reads less like a conventional court ruling and more like a careful audit of governance. By documenting these failures in detail, the court created a public record that could not easily be dismissed or forgotten.
The case also made an important contribution to constitutional doctrine by clarifying the scope of suo motu powers available to High Courts. Although such powers are often associated with the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Justice Isa emphasized that High Courts may also intervene where urgent violations of fundamental rights are involved. At the same time, he stressed that this power must be exercised with restraint. Courts, he noted, should not become substitutes for the executive or attempt to manage policy. Suo motu jurisdiction should remain limited to exceptional circumstances where immediate intervention is necessary to prevent injustice. This balanced approach affirmed the judiciary’s role as a guardian of rights while respecting the constitutional principle of separation of powers.
Another important aspect of the judgment is its treatment of the media. Justice Isa acknowledged the importance of freedom of expression but made clear that this freedom is not absolute. He warned that media platforms cannot be used to propagate or legitimize extremist ideologies, particularly those that incite violence or support terrorism. In a country where media narratives can strongly influence public perception, this observation carries considerable weight. At the same time, it raises a difficult and continuing question: how should the state distinguish between responsible regulation and undue restriction? That tension remains central to debates on press freedom and public safety.
Beyond its legal reasoning, the judgment is powerful because it places human suffering at its center. It recognizes that the Hazara community was not merely a collection of victims, but a marginalized group living under persistent threat. By highlighting their vulnerability, the court underscored the importance of substantive equality: the idea that equal protection under the law may require greater state attention where risks are unevenly distributed. This human rights perspective is a defining feature of Justice Isa’s jurisprudence and helps explain why the case continues to be cited in discussions on minority protection, state responsibility, and constitutional accountability.
Yet the case also reveals the limits of judicial intervention. The court could identify failures, articulate standards of accountability, and clarify constitutional duties, but it could not itself implement the reforms required to prevent future violence. That responsibility belonged to the executive. The persistence of sectarian attacks in the years that followed suggests that progress remained uneven. This gap between judicial pronouncement and practical enforcement is not unique to Pakistan, but it becomes especially visible in cases involving security, governance, and the protection of vulnerable communities.
Even so, the significance of the Hazara Killings case lies in what it achieved within those limits. It compelled the state to confront its own shortcomings, gave judicial recognition to the suffering of a marginalized community, and set out a framework for understanding constitutional responsibility in the face of terrorism. It also demonstrated that courts can play a vital role in moments of crisis, not by replacing other institutions, but by holding them to their constitutional obligations.
Even thirteen years later, the judgment remains a powerful reminder that the rule of law is measured not by a state’s treatment of the powerful, but by its protection of those most at risk. In giving that principle legal force, Justice Qazi Faez Isa did more than decide a case; he articulated a constitutional standard that continues to challenge Pakistan’s institutions to act with greater responsibility, accountability, and respect for human rights.
