By Musawir Qureshi
For quite some time now, discussions about creating new provinces in Pakistan — particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa — have continued to gain attention. Among these, the movement for a separate Hazara province is considered especially significant. Certain political circles are paving the way for the creation of Hazara province, while many Hindko-speaking people consider it their legitimate right.
When Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was previously known as the “North-West Frontier Province” (NWFP), nationalist political parties initially demanded the name “Pashtunistan” and later “Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.” At that time, some Hindko-speaking politicians opposed the change and began demanding a separate Hazara province. It is true that Hindko speakers do not live only in Hazara Division; they are also settled in Peshawar and other parts of the province. However, overall, Pashtuns remain the majority population.
Nationalist parties opposed the Hazara province demand at the time because multiple languages are spoken across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Their argument was that if provinces were created on linguistic grounds, then every linguistic group would eventually demand its own separate province, which could spread division and hatred within the province.
Today, discussions about Hazara province and even a Saraiki province are once again being heard on social media and in certain political gatherings. Interestingly, such movements do not appear as strongly in other provinces of Pakistan, yet in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa this debate repeatedly resurfaces. The question is: what are the real objectives behind it? This issue deserves serious and detailed consideration.
There are concerns that certain anti-state elements are trying to exploit these debates to create division among Pashtuns and other ethnic communities of the province. Many of those spreading such propaganda are reportedly based abroad and actively promote narratives that may deepen mistrust and instability. Such efforts should be countered before they succeed in creating further discord.
The debate over new provinces in Pakistan is not new. However, when proposals emerge to divide different regions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the matter goes beyond administrative convenience alone. It also involves resources, trade routes, minerals, water, geography, politics, and the future balance of power. This is why the possible division of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has created deep concern among many Pashtuns.
On the surface, it is argued that new provinces would reduce administrative difficulties, accelerate development, and improve representation for remote regions. Yet, upon closer examination, it appears that the issue is not merely administrative; rather, it also concerns the redistribution of economic and strategic power.
If, according to some proposed plans, a separate “Khyber Province” were formed including Peshawar, Mardan, Swat, Dir, Charsadda, and Khyber districts, it would control the strategically important Torkham trade route with Afghanistan. Although relations between the two countries are currently strained and the border situation remains unstable, there is hope that ties will eventually improve. Torkham is not merely a border crossing; it is an economic lifeline for the entire region. Afghan transit trade, access to Central Asia, future regional commerce, and potential economic corridors would largely fall under the authority of such a province.
Additionally, regions like Swat, Dir, and Malakand are rich in natural resources. Forests, tourism, emeralds, marble, minerals, and water resources already play a major role in the economy. If these assets were placed under a separate administrative unit, its economic status could become extremely strong. Alongside this, developed urban centers like Peshawar, educational institutions, business hubs, and existing infrastructure would also become part of that province.
On the other hand, if Hazara were made a separate province, then the Indus River, Tarbela Dam, the Dasu hydropower project, and major energy resources would fall within its jurisdiction. As a result, this province would gain considerable influence over Pakistan’s water and energy sectors. Furthermore, the Karakoram Highway and the land route to China would significantly increase Hazara’s geopolitical importance.
Southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa — including Dera Ismail Khan, Tank, Bannu, Lakki Marwat, and some former tribal areas — possesses gas, oil, and other mineral resources. However, the region still lacks strong industrial infrastructure, educational progress, roads, healthcare facilities, and other basic development indicators. Even today, local populations often do not fully benefit from these resources. If this area were turned into a separate administrative unit, it would likely take considerable time before it could stand economically on its own feet.
Similarly, mountainous regions such as Kohistan possess enormous potential in terms of minerals, forests, rivers, and hydropower generation. Yet low population density, difficult geography, and weak infrastructure make it difficult for such areas to immediately function as strong provinces.
The fundamental question is whether such divisions would genuinely solve people’s problems, or whether they are actually about redrawing the boundaries of resources and power.
The Pashtun nation has already suffered from divisions caused by borders, political rivalries, tribal separations, and ideological differences. On one side, the Durand Line divided families and culture; on the other, domestic politics created distances between different regions. In the age of social media, hateful narratives have deepened these divisions further. Today, Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa often criticize one another, while linguistic and regional tensions within the province continue to grow.
If these divisions take on administrative and economic forms as well, there is fear that Pashtuns may become even weaker. Future disputes over resources, water politics, ownership of minerals, and trade routes could create entirely new conflicts. In such circumstances, those forces that have long followed the policy of “divide and rule” may benefit the most.
It is also important to recognize that in many countries around the world, new provinces and administrative units are created for development purposes. However, those systems also ensure fair distribution of resources, political harmony, and protection of collective identity. If the debate over new provinces in Pakistan is truly serious, then it should not be driven merely by political slogans or temporary interests; it must instead be examined under a comprehensive national policy framework.
There is a need for Pashtun leaders, intellectuals, youth, and political forces to engage in realistic dialogue rather than emotional reactions. If new provinces are genuinely intended to improve governance, public convenience, and balanced development, then the matter deserves open discussion. But if the purpose is to place resources and power under the control of specific groups, then this is not merely an administrative issue — it becomes a question of national and ethnic future, which could prove dangerous.
The true strength of the Pashtun people lies in their unity, shared culture, language, and historical consciousness. If that bond weakens, then not only maps will change, but the entire political and economic direction of the region may also be transformed.
